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UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO v DERDEYN. THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS
URINALYSIS DRUG-TESTING OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
By the time they have made the pros, most athletes have
been given so many pills, salves, injections and potions, by
amateur and pro coaches, doctors and trainers, to pick
them up, cool them out, kill pain, enhance performance,
reduce inflammation and erase anxiety, that there isn't
much they won't sniff, spread, stick in or swallow to get
bigger or smaller, or to feel goooood.
- Robert Lipsyte1
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug-testing in athletics became one of the most publicized
topics of the 1980s.2 Drug-testing has often been the subject of ne-
gotiation, arbitration, legislation and litigation.3 The complexity
and confusion over drug-testing results from numerous standards,
rules and findings which differ depending on the sport.4
1. JONATHAN HARRIS, DRUGGED ATHLETES: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SPORTS 1
(1987) (citing Robert Lipsyte, Baseball and Drugs, THE NATION, May 25, 1985).
2. GARY A. WADLER & BRIAN HAINLINE, DRUGS AND THE ATHLETE 196 (1989)
(citing D.L. Breo, MDs Call For Mandatory Drug Tests, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 14,
1986, at 25;J.V. Lamar, Jr., Scoring Off the Fied, Tim, Aug. 25, 1986, at 52; M. Rust,
Drug Deaths Heat Up Testing Debate, Am. MED. NEWS, July 18, 1986, at 1; M. Topol,
Drug Testing Gaining Foothol4 NEWSDAY, July 9, 1985; C. Wolff, Bosworth Barred from
Bowl for Steroids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1986).
3. Id. (citing ACLU Files Lawsuit On Drug Testing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 7, 1987; WJ.
Curran, Compulsory Drug Testing: The Legal Barriers, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 318
(1987); Drug Plan Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1986; Drug Test Lost By Jockeys,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1986; D.M. Gianelli, Drug Testing Programs Face Legal Challenge,
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 12, 1986; P. Kerr, Drug Tests Losing Most Court Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1986; M. Nobel, Drug Tests Are In Vwlation, NEWSDAY, July 31, 1986;
Rozelle's Plan For Unscheduled Drug Testing Over-Turned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1986; M.
Rust, County May Bar Most Drug Testing, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 12, 1986; Steroid Rul-
ing Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1987; Time Right To Resolve Plan For Drug Testing,
NEWSDAY, June 22, 1986).
4. Id. (citing M. Duda, Drug Testing in Professional Sports, 13 THE PHYSICIAN AND
SPORTSMEDICINE 46 (1985); M. Duda, Drug Testing Challenges Colleges and Pro Athletes,
12 THE PHYSICIAN AND SPORTSMEDICINE 109 (1984); A Matter of Policy, NEWSDAY, July
11, 1986; Drug Ban For 15 Pentathletes, NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1986; Drug Testing For
Tennis Pros, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1985; M. Goodwin, Should Baseball Have Mandatory
Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1985; IAAF To Expand Drug-Testing Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1987; P. King, The NIFL Drug Plan, NEWSDAY, July 8, 1986; Marathon
Drug Test, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1986; Marathoner's Drug Test Positive, Friends Say, NEWS-
(361)
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In 1986, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
implemented a drug-testing program. 5 Subsequently, many of the
universities that were members of the NCAA implemented their
own drug-testing programs.6 Originally, the purpose of such testing
programs was to eliminate any competitive advantage an athlete
may obtain due to drug use.7 Due to "recreational" drug abuse
among athletes, the rationale behind drug-testing has been ex-
panded to include: "casefinding of individuals with a drug problem;
screening teams or groups of athletes for evidence of drug abuse;
protecting other athletes from injury caused by the drug-abusing
athlete; enhancing the role model perception of athletes; deterring
drug abuse by athletes; and minimizing criminality."8
Urinalysis drug-testing, which is conducted by the NCAA and
a number of universities across the country, clearly constitutes a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 9 The student athlete has
a valid expectation of privacy which is violated in two respects.10
First, an individual has a privacy right in the confidentiality of his
medical records." Disclosure of test results without authorization
violates the privacy right of an individual.' 2 Second, the student
DAY, July 14, 1986; P. Monahan, Golden Gloves-Drug Testing Now Required, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 30, 1986; O.K. of Riders'Drug Tests in NewJersey May Set Precedent, NEWS-
DAY, July 14, 1986; J. Pricci, Drug Issue Still Cloudy, NEWSDAY, Dec. 14, 1986; G. Vec-
sey, After Race, Testing Starts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1986).
5. C. Claude Teagarden, Suspicionless Punitive Urinalysis Testing of College and
University Student-Athletes, 65 EDUC. L. REP. 999, 1000 (1991). The NCAA originally
tested student athletes at 73 championship events and 18 post-season football bowl
games. Id. The drug-testing program produced interesting results. During the
1986-87 academic year, for example, 34 out of 3,360 student athletes tested posi-
tive for drug usage, in particular the use of anabolic steroids. Id. In the Fall 1987-
88 championship season, 1.3% of the 1,589 student athletes tested positive, while
during the 1988-89 season, only .8% out of 3,700 student athletes tested positive
for drugs. Id. The NCAA's drug-testing program revealed that fewer student ath-
letes tested positive than the NCAA had originally expected. Id. In 1989, the
NCAA Executive Director, Richard D. Schultz, indicated that year-round testing
must begin, because only the "dumb ones" were being caught. Id.
6. Stephen F. Brock, Kevin M. McKenna & Rhett Traband, Drug Testing College
Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup Runneth Over?, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 57 (1994).
7. WADLER & HAINLINE, supra note 2, at 197.
8. Id.
9. Teagarden, supra note 5, at 1011 (citing Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp.
997, 1003 (W.D. Wash. 1988)).
10. Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the Con-
stitutional Challenge, 76 IowA L. REv. 107, 133 (1990). The athlete's expectation of
privacy extends to the medical information yielded by the urinalysis as well as the
very act of urination. Teagarden, supra note 5, at 1011.
11. Id. Knapp, supra note 10, at 133.
12. Id.
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athlete's right to privacy is also violated if the state institution's in-
terests do not outweigh the student athlete's privacy concerns. 13
In the Fall of 1984, the University of Colorado (CU) began a
drug-testing program for its intercollegiate student athletes. 14
Although it has been amended several times,1 5 the program has al-
ways prohibited students from participating in intercollegiate ath-
letics if they did not sign a form consenting to random urinalysis
drug-testing.' 6 When CU student athletes challenged the constitu-
tionality of the program, the trial court concluded that without in-
dividualized suspicion,17 CU's drug-testing program violates the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee that "persons shall be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by the gov-
ernment."1 The Colorado Court of Appeals essentially affirmed
the trial court's opinion.19 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed the appellate court's opinion.20
This Note will initially describe the facts upon which the
Derdeyn case developed. The Note will then establish the back-
ground which is necessary to fully analyze the legal issues in the
case. Next, the Note will examine and critique the Supreme Court
of Colorado's analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of
13. Id.
14. University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. 1993).
15. For a discussion of CU's drug-testing program, as well as the various
amendments, see infra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
16. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 930.
17. The trial court stated that urinalysis drug-testing can only be conducted
with probable cause, which is required under the Fourth Amendment. Derdeyn,
863 P.2d at 934. According to the trial court, reasonable suspicion is not sufficient
to conduct urinalysis drug-testing. Id.
The terms "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" are difficult to define
with precision. See Teagarden, supra note 5, at 1015 (stating the "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard lacks precision and clarity). "Probable cause" can be defined as
"[a] set of probabilities grounded in the factual and practical considerations which
govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more than mere
suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction." BLcK's
LAw DICrIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (citing United States v. Riemer, 392 F. Supp.
1291, 1294 (S.D. Ohio 1975)). The holding of the trial court indicates that prob-
able cause is a stronger standard than reasonable suspicion. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at
934.
18. Id. at 934. For a brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment, see infra
notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
19. Derdeyn v. University of Colo., 832 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The
court of appeals, however, indicated that reasonable suspicion could be used in
some instances for mandatory drug-testing of intercollegiate athletes at CU. Id. at
1035.
20. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 950. For a full discussion of the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court of Colorado, see infra notes 72-124 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the dissenting opinions, see infra notes 125-146 and accom-
panying text.
1996] 363
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CU's random, suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing. Finally, this
Note will discuss the impact of the Supreme Court of Colorado's
decision.
II. FACTS
In the Fall of 1984, CU instituted a drug-testing program for its
intercollegiate student athletes.2 1 Although the program has un-
dergone numerous changes, the program has always been
mandatory for all the university's athletes.22
CU amended its drug-testing program on three separate occa-
sions. Initially, in 1984, the program required urine tests for cer-
tain proscribed drugs at each intercollegiate athlete's annual
physical, in addition to subsequent random urine tests. 23 Under
the first version of the drug-testing program, if the test indicated a
positive result, counseling was mandatory.24 After a second positive
result, the athlete was suspended from intercollegiate athletics for
seven days. 25 If the athlete tested positive a third time, the athlete
received at minimum, a one-year suspension. 26 The first and sec-
ond amendments to the program, which underwent annual review,
added more stringent penalties.2 7
CU conducted its drug-testing program by subjecting its stu-
dent athletes to a urinalysis, which is one of the most common
methods used for drug-testing.28 Originally, the student athletes
21. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 930.
22. Id. If an athlete did not consent to the random drug testing, CU prohib-
ited the athlete from participating in intercollegiate athletics. Id Despite the
changes in the drug testing program, CU has always made the drug tests
mandatory. Derdeyr, 863 P.2d at 930 n.3.
23. Id. Drugs proscribed by CU included amphetamines, barbiturates, co-
caine, methaqualudes, opiates, morphine, codeine, PCP (angel dust) and ana-
logues and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC or marijuana). Id. at n.4. The third
amendment to the program added alcohol, over-the-counter drugs and perform-
ance enhancing substances such as anabolic steroids to the list of drugs for which
the athlete could be tested. Id. at 932.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 930-31.
26. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 931.
27. Id The first amendment increased the penalty for the first positive result
to suspension for the current competitive season. The second penalty increased to
permanent suspension from any CU athletics. Id. In addition, following the first
positive result, CU required the athlete to successfully complete a drug rehabilita-
tion program prior to further participation in CU athletics. Id. The second
amendment to the program increased the suspension for the first positive result to
a 12 month suspension. Id.
28. "[A] urinalysis was performed only after a finding of reasonable suspicion
that an athlete has used drugs and at the athlete's annual physical examination."
Id. at 932.
[Vol. III: p. 361
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were not monitored during the act of urination.2 The first amend-
ment to the program changed this procedure by requiring that the
"collection of the specimen will be observed, and the athlete will be
asked to disrobe in order to protect the integrity of the testing pro-
cedure."30 The third amendment to the program altered this prac-
tice by requiring only aural monitoring.31
Under the 1984 program, all test results were automatically
sent to the team physician.3 2 The student athlete must have previ-
ously consented to the release of test results to the head athletic
trainer at CU, parents or guardians or spouse, the head coach, the
athletic director and the drug counseling program at the
Wardenburg Student Health Center.33 CU's program made no spe-
cific or general assurances of confidentiality.3 4 While the first and
third amendments to the program made relatively minor changes
regarding the communication of test results to third parties,3 5 none
of these variations gave any confidentiality assurances.3 6
The third amendment to the program contained some provi-
sions which were not part of previous variations. The third amend-
ment defined "athlete" more expansively, referring to athletes as:
"all student participants in recognized intercollegiate sports, includ-
ing but not limited to student athletes, cheerleaders, student train-
ers and student managers."37 This amendment also substituted
"rapid eye examinations" (REE) for the random urinalysis drug-
testing.38 If a student did not perform well on the REE, or exhib-
ited physical or behavioral characteristics indicating drug abuse,
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 932. Under this procedure, the sample was collected within the ath-
letic department facilities in a private and enclosed area with a monitor outside.
Id.
32. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 931.
33. Id. The campus' health services are based at the Wardenburg Student
Health Center.
34. Id.
35. The first amendment still required the test results to be sent to the team
physician, but upon a positive result, the team physician was to inform the head
athletic trainer, who was then to notify the head coach. Id. In addition, an athlete
with a positive drug test result had to participate in a phone call with his/her
parents or guardians. Id. The third amendment continued to require the athlete
to consent to the release of the test results as in the original program. Id. at 932.
However, the third amendment did specify that the communications between an
athlete and the Wardenburg Student Health Center would be confidential. Id.
36. See id. at 931-32.
37. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 932.
38. Id.
1996]
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reasonable suspicion of drug use existed, and the student athlete
was required to take a urine test.39
In October of 1986, intercollegiate student athletes at CU filed
a class action suit "challenging the constitutionality of the drug-test-
ing program as it then existed and seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief."40 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that "in the
absence of voluntary consents, CU's random, suspicionless urinal-
ysis drug-testing of student athletes violates the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7, of the
Colorado Constitution."41 The court also held that the record sup-
ports the trial court's findings that "CU failed to show that consents
to such testing given by CU's athletes are voluntary for the purposes
of those same constitutional provisions."42 The court thus affirmed
the trial court's decision to permanently enjoin CU from continu-
ing the drug-testing program.43
III. BACKGROUND
The central issue in Derdeyn is whether CU violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sec-
tion 7, of the Colorado Constitution by conducting random, suspi-
cionless urinalysis drug-testing of student athletes in the absence of
voluntary consents. 44 In order to properly analyze the Derdeyn hold-
39. I. Behavioral characteristics that were considered indications of reason-
able suspicion for drug abuse included: tardiness, absenteeism, poor health habits,
emotional swings, unexplained performance changes and/or excessive aggressive-
ness. Id.
40. Id. The class consisted of "those present and prospective student athletes
who are or will be subject to the University of Colorado intercollegiate athletic
department's drug education program as a condition of participation in the Uni-
versity of Colorado intercollegiate athletic program." Id. at 933 n.9.
The allegations within the plaintiffs' complaint indicate that the then-existing
program was the first amended program. Id. at 933 n.10. That program required
students to be directly observed during the act of urination, while the penalty for
the first positive test result included suspension for the current competitive season.
Id
The defendants have previously "refused to agree that they will not return to
the policy which was initially challenged in this class action." Id. at 933. Thus, the
trial court concluded that "the legality of CU's prior drug testing is not moot." Id.
41. Id at 930. For a brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment, see infra
notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 930. For a brief discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment, see infra note 45-51 and accompanying text.
In analyzing Derdeyn, it is sufficient to scrutinize the random, suspicionless
urinalysis drug-testing according to the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to Article
II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, since the Colorado Constitution pro-
vides slightly more protection than the wording of its federal counterpart. People
[Vol. III: p. 361
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ing, there must be a thorough understanding of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment and its application.
A. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause."45 The Supreme Court has interpreted this lan-
guage to mean that a search conducted by an agent of the state
must be supported by a warrant issued upon probable cause. 46 If
the search in question involves a special governmental need beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, a warrant or probable cause
requirement may hinder the objective of the search and, therefore,
courts may substitute their own balancing tests. 47 Generally, the
balancing test employed by a court consists of weighing the intru-
v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo. 1985). If a search is illegal under the United
States Constitution, it is necessarily illegal under the Colorado Constitution.
45. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
46. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984)).
Courts have generally recognized three instances when a search may be con-
ducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause. State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d
324, 325 (Iowa 1977) (citing State v.Jackson, 210 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1973)).
These exceptions include searches which are: (1) incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
preceded by an informed and voluntary consent; and (3) conducted under exigent
circumstances. Id.
47. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. In Derdeyn, the special governmental needs
which would be hampered by a warrant or probable cause requirement were: the
need to protect the health and safety of intercollegiate student athletes, to prevent
drug use by other students who look to the student athletes as role models, to
maintain the integrity of its athletic program and to promote fair competition.
Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 945-46, 945 n.30.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the government's interest in dispens-
ing with the warrant requirement is heightened when "the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search."
Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). Alcohol and
other drugs are constantly being eliminated from the bloodstream. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 24,291 (1984). Thus, blood and breath samples must be obtained as soon as
possible to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream at a certain
time or event. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (holding
officer was permitted to withdraw blood from defendant to prevent destruction of
evidence). Organizations such as railroads, hospitals and schools are not familiar
with the warrant procedures of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby result-
ing in further delay if warrant requirements were imposed. See Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (citing NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)).
1996]
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sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
promotion of the government interests involved. 48
A warrantless search is permissible when the individual has vol-
untarily consented to such a search.49 In order to determine
whether consent has been voluntarily given, consent must be "intel-
ligently and freely given, without any duress, coercion or subtle
promises or threats calculated to flaw the free and unconstrained
nature of the decision." 50 This determination is a question of fact
determined from "the totality of the circumstances."51
A form of coercion invalidating the finding of consent is the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine provides
that "on at least some occasions, receipt of a benefit to which some-
one has no constitutional entitlement does not justify making that
person abandon some right guaranteed under the Constitution." 52
Otherwise, "if the government could deny a benefit to a person be-
cause of his [exercise of] constitutionally protected [rights], his ex-
ercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited."53
48. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
49. "A warrantless search of an individual is generally reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if the individual has voluntarily consented to it." University of
Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 946 (Colo. 1993) (citing Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222 (1973)).
50. People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984).
51. Id See also, Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 946 (stating that "[a] warrantless search of
an individual is generally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the individ-
ual has voluntarily consented to it.").
52. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 953-54 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, The Supreme Court 1987
Term, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5, 6-7 (1988)).
53. Id. at 947 (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972)).
There are a number of cases in which courts have held that consent is not
voluntarily given due to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See Bostic v.
McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding consent by city clerk's
office and police personnel to urinalysis testing not voluntary where employment
would have been terminated if personnel refused participation); Feliciano v. City
of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (indicating that consent to
urinalysis testing by police academy cadets was not voluntary where cadets believed
such testing was essential to their jobs); American Fed'n of Gov't. Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (ruling that consent to mandatory
Department of Defense urinalysis testing was not voluntary since such consent was
condition to maintaining job); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that high school students cannot give valid consent
to random drug-testing if it is condition for participation in interscholastic
athletics).
[Vol. III: p. 361
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B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Random, Suspicionless,
Urinalysis Drug-Testing
In order for the Fourth Amendment to apply to random, suspi-
cionless urinalysis drug-testing, such testing must first be deemed a
"search." 54 The Supreme Court has stated that the "Federal Courts
of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these
intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment."55
The administrator conducting the test must additionally be act-
ing on the government's behalf in order to implicate the Fourth
Amendment.56 A number of federal courts have held that Fourth
Amendment protection extends to student athletes in athletic pro-
grams of state schools or universities. 57 The Fourth Amendment
has thus protected individuals from unreasonable searches even
when the government acts as the administrator of an athletic pro-
gram in a state school or university.58
In cases where no search warrant or probable cause exists, a
number of circuit courts have used a balancing test to determine
whether random, suspicionless drug-testing is reasonable under cer-
tain circumstances. While several courts have upheld such test-
ing,5 9 many others have rejected such testing. 60
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. "[I]t is clear that the collection and testing of
urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable .... these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. (citing Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987);
Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 176, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); McDon-
ell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987)).
56. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665. "Our earlier cases have settled that the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted
by the government .... ." Id.
57. See Schaill, 864 F.2d 1309; Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
58. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 935-36.
59. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932
F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing bus or commercial truck drivers who
operate "enormous" trucks such that "a single mistake in judgment or momentary
lapse in attention can have devastating consequences for other travelers"); Thom-
son v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing civilian employees of
chemical weapons plant with access to areas where experiments are performed
with highly lethal chemical warfare agents); Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476, 1477
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing drivers, mechanics and attendants whose primary duty
is daily transportation of handicapped children on school buses); Taylor v.
O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1199 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing county correctional em-
ployees with regular access to prisoners or weapons). Random, suspicionless test-
ing was upheld in a variety of different circumstances.
60. There are a number of cases in which random, suspicionless drug testing
was found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1201 (describing county
1996]
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C. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Random, Suspicionless
Drug-Testing
The Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of random,
suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing in two key cases. The first case,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,6 1 employed a balanc-
ing test whereby the Court gauged the reasonableness of the search
by weighing the privacy interests of the individual against the gov-
ernment interests at stake.62 While conducting the balancing test,
the Court determined that the government had a compelling inter-
est in conducting suspicionless testing of railroad employees in-
volved in certain types of train accidents.63 The Court also
determined that such employees "had diminished expectations of
privacy for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they
participated in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure
safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fit-
ness of covered employees."64 The Court concluded that the gov-
correctional employees with no regular access to prisoners, no reasonable oppor-
tunity to smuggle narcotics to prisoners and no access to firearms); National Fed'n
of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing civil-
ian laboratory workers at Army's forensic drug testing laboratories); Harmon v.
Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing United States Depart-
ment of Justice employees, including prosecutors in criminal cases, who have ac-
cess to grand jury proceedings).
61. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). In Skinner, evidence was presented which indicated
that railroad employee alcohol and drug abuse had contributed to many serious
train accidents. Id- A 1979 study indicated that roughly "one out of every eight
railroad workers drank at least once while on duty." Id at 607 n.1 (citing 48 Fed.
Reg. 30,724 (1983)). Furthermore, "5% of workers reported to work 'very drunk'
or got 'very drunk' on duty at least once." Id. As a result, the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) established safety standards which required railroad employ-
ees to submit to blood and urine tests following certain major train accidents. Id.
at 608 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.203(a) (1987)). In addition, similar tests were au-
thorized to be administered to an employee violating certain safety rules. Id. (cit-
ing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(3) (1987)).
62. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
63. Id. at 628. There is a compelling interest because the employees "subject
to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." Id. FRA regula-
tions state that "[tloxicological testing is required following a 'major train acci-
dent,' which is defined as any train accident that involves (i) a fatality, (ii) the
release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable in-
jury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more." Id. at 608 (quoting
49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1987)).
Testing is also required after an "impact accident" which is defined as "a colli-
sion that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to railroad property of
$50,000 or more." Id, (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a) (2) (1987)). Finally, testing
is required after "any train accident that involves a fatality to any on duty railroad
employee." Id (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(3) (1987)).
64. Id, at 627. Congress recognized the "relation between safety and em-
ployee fitness" when it enacted the Hours of Service Act in 1907, Baltimore & Ohio
10
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ernment's compelling interests outweighed any privacy concerns
implicated by the toxicological testing.65
The Supreme Court again addressed the drug-testing issue in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.66 Holding that the
government was justified in conducting drug-testing, the Court
found that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that the United States Custom Service maintains employees that are
"physically fit and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment."67
The Court ruled that there is a further compelling interest in
preventing Custom Service employees from utilizing deadly force in
a reckless manner.68 Finally, the Court held that governmental in-
terests in safeguarding the nation's borders and public safety out-
weigh the privacy expectations of employees responsible for
interdicting illegal drugs or their requirement to carry a firearm. 69
These two cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court has dealt
with the constitutionality of suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing.
The governmental interest in the testing program must be weighed
against the individual's Fourth Amendment interests.7 0 While it is
R. Co. v. I.C.C., 221 U.S. 612, 619 (1911), "and also when it authorized the Secre-
tary to 'test... railroad facilities, equipment, rolling stock, operations, or persons,
as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions' of the Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970." Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 437(a) (1988)).
65. Id. at 633.
66. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). This case involved a drug-screening program imple-
mented by the United States Custom Service (USCS) which required urinalysis
tests to be conducted upon USCS employees seeking transfer or promotion "to
positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the incum-
bent to carry firearms or to handle 'classified' material." Id.
67. Id. at 670. It is well established that travelers entering the United States
may be stopped and required to submit to a routine search, even though there is
no probable cause to believe the traveler is bringing something into or entering
the United States illegally. Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154
(1925)). The governmental interest in self-protection could be irreparably dam-
aged if USCS employees were "unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting nar-
cotics." Id. A USCS employee that is also indifferent to the mission of the USCS
has the ability to facilitate importation of large drug shipments or block apprehen-
sion of dangerous criminals. Id.
68. Id. at 670-71. Customs employees who may use deadly force plainly "dis-
charge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary
lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences." Id. at 671. The Court
agreed with the government's position that the public should not have to bear the
risk "that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will
be promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly force." Id.
69. Id. at 677. The Court has recognized that " 'operational realities of the
workplace' may render entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by su-
pervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts."
Id. at 671 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717, 732 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
70. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
1996]
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helpful to analyze how the Court has applied a balancing test in
order to see if such a search is reasonable, the balancing test is fact-
specific, applied on a case-by-case basis and determined by the total-
ity of the circumstances.71
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
In University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado focused on the Fourth Amendment implication of this case.
The Fourth Amendment is implicated if state action exists and
there has been a search.72 If the case at hand involves both of these
elements, the court must then determine whether the search is
reasonable. 73
Initially, the court in Derdeyn established that the Fourth
Amendment applied to CU's random, suspicionless urinalysis drug-
testing program. The court stated that "[t] he Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unrea-
sonable searches conducted by the government, even when the gov-
ernment acts as the administrator of an athletic program in a state
school or university."74 In Derdeyn, the court found that state action
existed,75 and the urinalysis conducted by CU was indeed a search
because it violated the student athlete's legitimate expectation of
privacy.76
The court then focused on the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, the court concluded that CU's
drug-testing program was designed for a special government inter-
est beyond the needs of ordinary law enforcement. 77 The Derdeyn
71. For a brief summary of cases that have decided whether suspicionless
urinalysis drug-testing is constitutional using a balancing test, see supra notes 59 &
60.
72. For a brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment, see supra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
73. Id
74. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 935-36 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Schaill 864
F.2d 1309; Brooks, 730 F. Supp. 759).
75. Id. at 930 n.1. ("The parties have agreed that [CU] is a state institution,
and that the actions of the individual defendants constitute state action for all
purposes relevant to this case.")
76. Id at 936. "[ilt is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable....
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
(quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617).
77. For a further discussion of the special government interest, see supra note
47 and accompanying text.
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court, therefore, used a balancing test similar to that which the
Supreme Court applied in both Skinner and Von Raab.78
1. Balancing Test
The court balanced the student athlete's privacy interests with
CU's governmental interests to determine whether the search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.79 The court initially
addressed the arguments presented by CU contending that student
athletes have a lower expectation of privacy. 80 The court stated that
"it cannot be said that university students, simply because they are
university students, are entitled to less protection than other per-
sons under the Fourth Amendment."81
First, CU argued that its testing procedures were not seriously
intrusive because the monitoring was aural, rather than visual.82
The court rejected this argument, asserting that aural monitoring is
not necessarily less intrusive than visual monitoring. 3 The court
further noted that CU did not rule out the possibility of returning
to visual monitoring.84 CU also contended that student athletes
have a diminished expectation of privacy because they regularly
provide urine samples in annual examinations and require close
78. For a discussion of Skinner and Von Raab, in which the Supreme Court
utilized a balancing test, see supra notes 61-71.
79. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 936 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619). In Skinner, the
Supreme Court stated that reasonableness "depends on all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself."
Id.
For a brief discussion of CU's asserted governmental interests, see infra note
103 and accompanying text.
80. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 937.
81. Id. at 938 (citing Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997, 998 (D.N.H.
1976); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1359, 1367, 1367 n.ll (S.D. Tex. 1976);
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 786 (W.D. Mich. 1975)).
The court found that Fourth Amendment cases involving high school students
were not very instructive in deciding Derdeyn. Id. at 939 (citing Schaill. 864 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1988); In re P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988); Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992)). The court considered cases in-
volving the Fourth Amendment rights of adults in the workplace environment
much more instructive. Id.
In Acton, the court "specifically distinguished the case before it, on factual
grounds, from a case such as Derdeyn, 832 P.2d 1031, that involved 'college students
who have, for the most part, reached the age of adulthood.'" Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at
939 n.19 (quoting Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363 n.7).
82. Id. at 939.
83. Id. Generally, the court agreed that aural monitoring is less intrusive than
visual monitoring. Id. A female student's testimony regarding aural monitoring,
indicated that such monitoring is still quite intrusive. Id. at 939 n.20. When asked
how she felt about someone standing outside the room while providing the sam-
ple, she stated that it was bothersome and embarrassing. Id.
84. Id. at 939.
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physical contact with the trainers who administer the urinalysis. 85
The court noted, however, that while the Supreme Court has stated
that urinalysis testing is less intrusive in a medical environment,8 6
testimony indicated that CU's drug-testing was not conducted in
such an environment.87 While random, suspicionless urinalysis
drug-testing may be less intrusive for individuals who are required
by their jobs to undergo frequent medical examinations,88 the
court distinguished student athletes and would not classify them as
those who must undergo frequent medical examinations.89 The
court concluded that a student athlete's privacy interests are just as
strong as those of ordinary people who undergo annual physical
examinations. 90
CU's next argument in defense of its program is that the stu-
dent athlete's privacy interests are lowered because he already sub-
mits to extensive on- and off-campus regulations.91 The court
rejected this argument since those regulations do not intrude upon
the student athletes' privacy interests as extensively as a urinalysis.92
CU further argued that the student athletes' privacy interests
are diminished because they must submit to the NCAA's random
urinalysis drug-testing as a prerequisite to participation in NCAA
athletics. 93 The court recognized that the NCAA's requirement
85. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 939-40.
86. Id. at 940 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
87. One female student testified that while "the trainers were treating me it
was more like I was getting medical treatment." Id. at 940 n.21. She stated, how-
ever, that in the instance of drug-testing, "it was more like they were a policeman,
more like an enforcement type situation and the atmosphere changed from
friendly to adversarial." Id
88. See Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1991).
89. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 940. The court supported its distinction between stu-
dent athletes and individuals who undergo frequent medical treatment by refer-
ring to testimony from one student athlete that stated, "I have never been injured,
I have been lucky and so the only time I saw the trainers was for a urinalysis." Id.
90. Id. The Seventh Circuit suggested that people who undergo medical or
other intrusions on a routine basis will be less sensitive to such intrusions. Dimeo,
943 F.2d at 682. However, the court in Derdeyn believed that people that merely
undergo an annual examination do not fit into Dimeo's category of "those who
must undergo 'frequent' medical examinations." Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 940.
91. Id. Some of these regulations included "maintenance of required levels of
academic performance, monitoring of course selection, training rules, mandatory
practice sessions, diet restrictions, attendance at study halls, curfews, and prohibi-
tions on alcohol and drug use." Id.
92. Id. at 941.
93. Id. CU's athletic director testified that the NCAA conducted random
drug-testing of athletes at championship events as well as drug-testing of the top
three finishers and certain starting players. Id. The record also indicated that the
NCAA required the athletes to sign consent forms for such testing. Id.
14
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could reduce the intrusiveness of another required test.94 The
court noted the testimony from the lower court which indicated
that a significant part of the intrusion was that friendly relationships
with CU trainers turned into "untrusting and confrontational" rela-
tionships during drug-testing. 95 Additionally, CU contended that
the consequence of refusing to provide a sample, not being allowed
to participate in intercollegiate athletics, is not severe.96 The court
did reject this argument because many intercollegiate athletes rely
on athletic scholarships to fund their education. 97 The court fur-
ther concluded that many athletes pursue careers in which it is ad-
vantageous to have intercollegiate athletics as a part of an athlete's
background.98 The court did recognize that intercollegiate athlet-
ics, in and of itself, is a valuable experience, 99 and therefore ineligi-
bility, according to the court, was a significant detriment. 10 0
Finally, CU asserted that a student athlete's expectation of pri-
vacy is diminished because positive test results were "confidential
and not used for purposes of criminal law enforcement." 10 1 The
court rejected this argument, indicating that CU never provided
any specific or general assurance of confidentiality in its written de-
scriptions of the university's drug-testing program.102
After rejecting all of CU's arguments regarding a student ath-
lete's lower expectation of privacy, the court addressed the strength
of the government interests involved. CU asserted a variety of gov-
ernment interests, including "preparing its athletes for drug testing
in NCAA championship events, promoting the integrity of its ath-
letic program, preventing drug use by other students who look to
the athletes as role models, ensuring fair competition and protect-
ing the health and safety of intercollegiate athletes."1 03 The court
94. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 941.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 941-42. CU claimed that ineligibility to participate in intercollegiate
athletics was not as serious a consequence as loss of employment, "as would be the
consequence in some government employee drug-testing cases." Id. at 942.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 941-42.
100. Id. at 942.
101. Id. The court noted that while an intrusion by the government is gener-
ally less intrusive when done for purposes other than law enforcement, this fact is
already accounted for, as a matter of law, when performing an analysis similar to
that of cases such as Skinner and Von Raab. Id. For a further discussion of Skinner
and Von Raab, see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
102. Id. The court found that students must consent to the release of drug-
testing information to a substantial number of people. Id.
103. Id, at 943.
19961
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noted that while many cases uphold random, suspicionless urinal-
ysis drug-testing when there is a compelling governmental interest
involved, 104 "the Supreme Court has not held that only a compel-
ling interest will suffice." 10 5 In fact, the court recognized that other
courts have upheld such testing without a compelling government
interest.'0 6 Instead of labeling the government interest as compel-
ling or substantial, the court decided to look at similar cases to see
what government interest justified, or did not justify, similar
intrusions.1 0
7
The court looked at decisions made by different circuit courts
to see how other jurisdictions balanced governmental and individ-
ual interests. 10 8 The court recognized that CU had a significant in-
terest in protecting the health and safety of its intercollegiate
athletes.109 The court, however, found that CU failed to demon-
strate that student athletes have a greatly diminished expectation of
privacy or that its program is not significantly intrusive.110 The
court also noted that although preventing drug use by other stu-
dents who look to athletes as role models may be a valid public
safety concern, CU offered no evidence that CU students view the
university athletes as role models.1 ' The court was also skeptical
about some of CU's alleged governmental interests and indicated
that CU failed to show how these interests were important. 112 Ulti-
104. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that have upheld suspicionless
urinalysis drug-testing with a compelling governmental interest, see supra notes 61-
71.
105. See Skinne, 489 U.S. at 624.
106. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 944 n.28 (citing Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 683 (characteriz-
ing state's financial interest in horse racing as "substantial" to justify suspicionless
urinalysis drug-testing); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Skin-
ner, 913 F.2d 1454, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing government's "strong" in-
terest in ensuring safety of natural and hazardous liquid pipeline industry through
suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing)).
107. Id. at 944. The court stated, "rather than trying to characterize CU's
interests as 'compelling,' 'strong,' 'substantial,' or of some lesser degree of impor-
tance, we think it is more instructive simply to compare them with other types of
commonly asserted interests that have been held sufficient or insufficient to justify
similar intrusions." Id.
108. For a brief summary of some of the cases the Derdeyn court reviewed, see
supra notes 59 & 60.
109. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 945.
110. Id. For a discussion of CU's attempts to show that student athletes had a
diminished expectation of privacy or that its drug-testing program was not signifi-
cantly intrusive, see supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 945. CU did not present any evidence to indicate that its program,
by deterring drug use among athletes, had diminished drug use among the gen-
eral student population. Id.
112. Id. at 945-46. The alleged government interests that CU did not explain
included the maintenance of the integrity of its athletic program, the promotion
Vol. III: p. 361
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mately, the court decided that the great majority of cases following
Skinner and Von Raab "clearly militate against the conclusion that
CU's program is a reasonable exercise of state power under the
Fourth Amendment." 11
2. Validity of Consent
CU argued that even if random drug-testing was not reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment, the university did not violate
the Constitution because student athletes voluntarily consented to
the testing at the beginning of the year. 114 The court recognized
that it must defer to the trial court's findings on voluntariness un-
less its findings were "clearly erroneous."" 5
The trial court made a factual finding that CU's student ath-
letes did not voluntarily consent to the drug-testing." 6 CU empha-
sized that there was not a factual finding regarding consent, but
rather an erroneous legal conclusion improperly based upon the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions." 7 The court rejected
of fair competition and the prevention of disqualification of its athletes at sporting
events. Id.
113. Id. at 945. Although the court believed that the government interest al-
leged was significant, CU's inability to show a diminished expectation of student
athlete privacy led the court to decide that the testing was a Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. The court also held that because the Colorado Constitution provides
at least as much protection for unreasonable searches and seizures as does the
Fourth Amendment, CU's drug-testing program was also unconstitutional under
Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 946.
114. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 946. The court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte to
demonstrate that "[a] warrantless search of an individual is generally reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if the individual has voluntarily consented to it."
412 U.S. 218, 219, 222 (1973). Thus, if the urinalysis drug-testing was too much of
an intrusion, then the athletes' voluntary consent would allow the intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment. A voluntary consent to a search is a "consent intelligently
and freely given, without any duress, coercion or subtle promises or threats calcu-
lated to flaw the free and unconstrained nature of the decision. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d
at 946 (quoting People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984)).
115. Id. (citing United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 878 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987)). The trial court
cited Bustamonte to establish that the government has the burden to prove the
voluntariness of consent. Id. (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
116. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 946. The evidence upon which the Supreme Court
based its decision regarding voluntariness included testimony from several inter-
collegiate student athletes who described "how and when they were presented with
consent forms to sign, and why they signed them." Id. The student athletes indi-
cated that they signed consent forms after the initial team meetings and that such
meetings occurred at the beginning of each academic year. Id. at 947 n.31. When
CU's counsel presented its evidence, it did not offer evidence regarding how or
when CU presented the student athletes with consent forms. Id. at 946.
117. I. at 947. For a brief discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions, see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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CU's assertion, concluding that the trial court did make a factual
finding regarding consent and used the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions as an alternative ground to find that the athletes
consented involuntarily.118
The court next determined whether the record supported the
trial court's finding that the CU athletes consented involuntarily.' 1 9
The record stated that a student may not participate in or receive a
scholarship for CU's intercollegiate athletics program absent a
signed consent.120 The record additionally indicated that CU ini-
tially notified the student athletes of the drug-testing program in a
general manner, but were later confronted with the specific rules
only when it may have been too late to apply to another institution
or athletic program. 21 No indication was noted in the record as to
whether CU gave its student athletes any assurance that more intru-
sive drug-testing methods will not be employed.1 22
After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in
agreement with the trial court, found that "CU failed to bear its
burden to prove that consents obtained pursuant to its random, sus-
picionless urinalysis drug-testing program for the certified class of
118. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 947. In applying the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the trial court stated that even though participation in athletics is a
"benefit" and not a "right," consent to a Fourth Amendment search must still be
voluntary. Id. A "right" is protected by the Constitution, whereas a "benefit" is not.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that while the government may deny benefits,
"if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his [exercise of]
constitutionally protected [rights], his exercise of those freedoms would in effect
be penalized and inhibited." Id. (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 583, 597
(1972)). The trial court applied this reasoning to CU and determined that "no
consent can be voluntary where the failure to consent results in a denial of the
governmental benefit." Id. The trial court concluded that the student athletes did
not voluntarily consent because refusing to consent resulted in a denial of partici-
pation in athletics, essentially conditioning a governmental benefit. Id. at 948.
The trial court cited a number of cases to support its position. For a brief discus-
sion of these cases, see supra note 52.
119. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 946-49. The consent of future students was an im-
portant issue because these students were a part of the class of plaintiffs who
brought the class action. Id. at 933 n.9. Although it appears impossible to evaluate
the consent of future students, the trial was conducted under the premise that "the
procedures for obtaining consents are standard components of the drug-testing
program and are uniform." Id. at 949. Consistent with this premise, CU made no
argument that individualized determinations are required or that consent cannot
be properly evaluated as far as prospective students are concerned. Id
120. Id at 949.
121. Id
122. Id. The record does not indicate whether prospective student athletes
were told that CU may revert back to former procedures or visual monitoring of
the collection of urine samples. Id.
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intercollegiate student athletes were voluntarily given."123 The
court, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. 2 4
B. Chief Justice Rovira's Dissent
Chief Justice Rovira dissented, asserting that the majority mis-
construed the trial court's ruling on the voluntariness of the stu-
dent athletes' consent.125 Specifically, ChiefJustice Rovira believed
the majority incorrectly declined to consider the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions. 126 He reasoned that the trial court relied
upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in deciding the
voluntariness of consent.12 7 He concluded that the case could have
only been logically decided using the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. 128 Chief Justice Rovira disagreed with the majority's
ruling that CU failed to establish the voluntary nature of the stu-
dent athletes' consent.129 He observed that the plaintiff class con-
sisted of "both present and prospective student athletes." 30
Therefore, Chief Justice Rovira reasoned it was not possible for the
trial court to hear any evidence regarding the voluntariness of con-
123. Id The court defined the requirements for voluntary consent as being
"freely given, without any duress, coercion or subtle promises or threats calculated
to flaw the free and unconstrained nature of the decision." Id. (citing Carlson, 667
P.2d at 318).
124. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 950 n.36. To decide whether consent is given volun-
tarily, courts have used the totality of the circumstances test, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions, or both. In Bostic v. McClendon and Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland, the trial courts utilized the totality of the circumstances test of Bus-
tamonte, finding that the consent of the respective plaintiffs was not voluntary.
Derdey, 863 P.2d at 948 (citing Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 593-95; Bostic, 650 F. Supp.
at 249). In American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, the trial court used the
totality test to illustrate lack of voluntary consent, as well as the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions for the proposition that consent to drug-testing was not a
valid condition of government employment. Id. (citing Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at
736). In Schaill, the court used only the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
holding that consent was not valid because it was a condition to participation in
interscholastic athletics. Id.
125. Id. at 951 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
127. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 952-53 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). For a discussion of
Chief Justice Rovira's application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
128. Id
129. Id at 951 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). The majority opinion supported the
trial court's findings regarding voluntary consent. Id. at 949 (Rovira, C.J., dissent-
ing). In doing so, the majority pointed out that it must defer to the trial court's
determination of such an issue unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 946
(Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 878 (10th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987)).
130. Id. at 951 n.1 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
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sent to drug-testing of prospective students because they are not
actually in CU's athletic program. 31 According to Chief Justice
Rovira's theory, the only evidence which the trial court could have
obtained is that which pertained to actual CU student athletes.13 2
Based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, Chief
Justice Rovira concluded that CU's program was constitutional.1 3 3
He noted that, with respect to present CU student athletes, the trial
court did not apply the totality of the circumstances test properly in
determining the voluntariness of consent.134 Chief Justice Rovira
indicated the impossibility of determining the level of coercion for
the entire class of plaintiffs because each individual student athlete
will react differently "depending on their circumstances."' 3 5
C. Justice Erickson's Dissent
Justice Erickson's dissent focused on the balancing test applied
in determining whether a suspicionless urinalysis drug-test is rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Justice Erickson believed that
CU's interests outweighed the student athletes' privacy concerns. 3 6
The Justice asserted three reasons why student athletes have dimin-
ished expectations of privacy: (1) student athletes are routinely
physically examined; (2) they voluntarily submit to extensive on-
and off-campus regulations; and (3) they regularly interact in a
communal locker room.137 He therefore concluded that the gov-
131. Id. at 951 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
132. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 951 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
133. Derdyn, 863 P.2d at 957 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Rovira
stated that in applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the court
should "balance the asserted governmental interest in conditioning the benefit
against the individual's interest in not being requested to waive Fourth Amend-
ment rights in order to receive that benefit." Id at 955 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
In finding that the government interests outweighed the individual's interests,
Chief Justice Rovira cited a number of cases in which courts have upheld condi-
tioning governmental benefits which are far less important than the right to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 956 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624 (1946)).
134. Id. at 952 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court adopted the
totality of the circumstances test in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218
(1973). The test states that the voluntariness of consent is "a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances." Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
135. Id. at 952 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rovira illustrated this
by differentiating between a student that depended on athletics as a financial re-
source to afford college and a student that did not need financial assistance. Id.
(Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 963 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
137. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 961-62 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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ernmental interests of protecting the health and safety of intercolle-
giate student athletes and preventing drug use by other students
looking to the athletes as role models outweighed the student ath-
letes' expectations of privacy. 138 Justice Erickson further stated that
"the important interests asserted by CU... would be placed in jeop-
ardy, and CU's efforts to achieve these goals significantly ham-
pered, if it were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion before testing a student athlete."13 9
Justice Erickson also addressed the issue of consent.1 40 Justice
Erickson agreed with the majority that, as an appellate court, they
must "defer to the trial court's findings on the factual issue of vol-
untariness unless its findings are clearly erroneous or not sup-
ported by the record."141 Justice Erickson stated, however, that the
trial court decided the issue of voluntary consent as a matter of law,
not as a factual matter. 42 Because an appellate court reviews find-
ings of law de novo, 143 Justice Erickson concluded that the majority
should have reviewed the voluntariness issue de novo instead of un-
necessarily deferring to the trial court's findings. 144
Justice Erickson concluded that "suspicionless drug-testing of
intercollegiate student athletes is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.. . ."145 He also indicated that "CU may validly
condition student athletes' participation in intercollegiate athletics
on a knowing and voluntary consent to the drug-testing
program."1 46
138. Id. at 962 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 963 (Erickson,J., dissenting). Justice Erickson agreed with the trial
court that "it is nearly impossible to ever establish reasonable suspicion of drug use
among student athletes." Id. at 963 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab. 489
U.S. at 668; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557; Camara v.
Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967)).
140. Id (Erickson, J., dissenting).
141. Id at 964 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citing Maj. op. at 946).
142. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 964 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson
pointed out that "[i]t is clear from a plain reading of the trial court's order that it
made no findings of fact regarding the validity of consent given by any individual
member of the class." Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting). The factual findings that the
majority relied upon, according to justice Erickson, appear in the trial court's or-
der as "conclusions of law." Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice
Erickson stated that the trial court relied on the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions "to conclude as a matter of law that no student athlete could validly consent
to a drug-testing program." Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
144. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 965 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 967 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
146. Id (Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson stated that consent to ran-
dom drug-testing is not per se invalid merely because it is a condition for partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting). A student athlete
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Although the majority opinion in University of Colorado v.
Derdeyn suggested the need to implement a balancing test in order
to determine whether random, suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing
is constitutional, the majority did not provide a standard indicating
the extent to which the governmental interests must outweigh indi-
vidual privacy concerns. The majority nevertheless determined that
the governmental interests in conducting random, suspicionless
urinalysis drug-testing did not outweigh the student athletes' pri-
vacy concerns. 147 The court looked at cases with a "compelling"
governmental interest, 48 and then examined cases where the gov-
ernmental interest was deemed "strong" or "substantial." 49 The
court, however, refused to characterize the governmental interest
which must be demonstrated and instead, focused upon other cases
"with other types of commonly asserted interests that have been
held sufficient or insufficient to justify similar intrusions."150
The majority compared the governmental interest CU asserted
with a variety of governmental interests arising from numerous
other fact patterns.' 5 ' None of the cases which the court used for
comparison, however, involved random, suspicionless urinalysis
drug-testing of university student athletes. 5 2 Thus, the compari-
sons employed by the court do not help in resolving the Derdeyn
case. Regardless, the court determined that the student athletes'
privacy interests outweighed CU's interests.153 The majority failed
to provide any sort of test or standard to help courts resolve similar
issues in future cases.
Many of the cases which the majority focused upon involved
the need for random, suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing to avoid
the risk of injury to others. 154 Instead of giving adequate considera-
can either withhold consent to such a program or choose another college or uni-
versity with a drug-testing program which is more acceptable to that student ath-
lete. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 945.
148. For a discussion of two Supreme Court cases in which the government
interest was deemed "compelling," see supra notes 61-71.
149. For a brief discussion of cases in which the government interest was
"strong" or "substantial," see supra note 106.
150. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 944. For a brief summary of cases that have decided
whether suspicionless urinalysis drug-testing is constitutional using a balancing
test, see supra notes 59 & 60.
151. 1d
152. See supra notes 61-71, 106 and accompanying text.
153. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 946.
154. For a brief discussion of cases in which the court analyzes the signifi-
cance of the government interest alleged, see supra notes 59-71 & 106.
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tion to the possible risk of injury to others, the court merely listed
some of CU's asserted interests in drug- testing.1 55 The court ulti-
mately should have discussed the potential risks of injury to
others.1 56 By not recognizing the full extent of the governmental
interest in public safety, the majority improperly balanced the gov-
ernmental interests against the student athletes' privacy concerns.
The majority improperly categorized the consents given by the
CU student athletes as involuntary. 157 The plaintiff class in this case
consisted of "both present and prospective student athletes."1 58 It
was therefore impossible to obtain any evidence from future stu-
dent athletes regarding the voluntariness of consent to random
drug-testing because future student athletes are not yet in the pro-
gram and, subsequently, have not yet been asked to give consent. 59
The only evidence which could have been obtained was that of ac-
tual student athletes. 160 Chief Justice Rovira further pointed out
that the voluntariness of consent varies according to the student
athlete.' 6 1 While some consents may be voluntary, it is impossible
to determine the voluntariness of consent of the entire class of
plaintiffs.
Because it was impossible to determine whether the entire class
of plaintiffs voluntarily consented to urinalysis drug-testing, the trial
court should have relied upon the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions.' 62 The doctrine would have produced the only legal find-
155. See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 943. Some of CU's listed interests included "pre-
paring its athletes for drug testing in NCAA championship events, promoting the
integrity of its athletic program, preventing drug use by other students who look to
athletes as role models, ensuring fair competition, and protecting the health and
safety of intercollegiate athletes." Id,
156. "Drug use which leads to increased aggression constitutes a grave physi-
cal threat to teammates and competitors." Knapp, supra note 10, at 113. In addi-
tion, the seriousness of drug abuse among athletes deserves attention because it
leads to greater health risks than non-athletic drug abuse. Id. at 107.
157. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 949.
158. Id. at 951 n.1 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
159. Id. at 951-52 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 951 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 952 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). Different student athletes are in dif-
ferent situations. Some experience financial strain and come under pressure to
consent to the drug testing in order to preserve their scholarship. Id. Others may
not be under financial pressure, but may still consent to the testing, in which case,
the consent is voluntary. Id. A heavily recruited student athlete typically does not
feel as much pressure since he/she can always participate in athletics elsewhere.
See id. (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
162. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 952 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). For a discussion of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see supra notes 52 & 53 and accompany-
ing text.
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ing applicable to both present and future CU students.'6 3 The
majority, therefore, should have applied the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions to analyze the voluntariness of the student ath-
letes' consent.164
VI. IMPACT
The Derdeyn holding will seriously affect Colorado state univer-
sities that implement drug-testing programs. Although the
Supreme Court of Colorado found CU's program unconstitutional,
it failed to provide Colorado state universities with the guidance
necessary to draft a constitutional drug-testing program. The drug-
testing procedures at issue in Derdeyn include CU's "random drug
testing programs, past, present and future."165 Thus, if drug-testing
is conducted according to CU's program to the date of the trial or
in a manner "substantially similar" to any of the programs CU used,
then the drug-testing will be held unconstitutional. 166
It is difficult, however, to determine exactly what "substantially
similar" means. As a result of the Derdeyn decision, a Colorado state
university does not know how to create a constitutional program, or
how to make an existing program constitutional.167 The result is
163. Id. at 952 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). In applying the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions, the Supreme Court has "consistently applied a balancing test
to determine what conditions on the receipt of a governmental benefit are permis-
sible and what conditions are not." Id. at 955 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). The test
used balances the governmental interest against the interest of the recipient of a
governmental benefit to determine whether the condition is constitutionally per-
missible. Id. (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rovira indicated that student athletes' interests are small com-
pared to other things which the government properly conditioned. Id at 956
(Rovira, C.J., dissenting); see Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (describing employment with
CIA); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 548 (describing government em-
ployment); Zap, 328 U.S. 624 (describing government contracts). Chief Justice
Rovira decided that the government interest outweighed the student athletes' in-
terest. Id. at 957 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).
164. The majority stated that "it is unnecessary and inappropriate for us to
consider whether the trial court reached a legally correct result under the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions." Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 929.
165. Id. at 933. This essentially means that all of the variations which have
been adopted up to the point of the trial are being contested. For a brief descrip-
tion of the various amendments to the program, see supra notes 23-39 and accom-
panying text. All of the variations were contested because the defendants "have
refused to agree that they will not return to the policy which was initially chal-
lenged in this class action." Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 933.
166. Id. at 946.
167. There are a number of pre-testing guidelines which may be helpful in
devising a constitutional program. To properly notify student athletes of the drug-
testing procedures, the institution should publish a drug-testing manual. Knapp,
supra note 10, at 135-36 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1989 Drug-
Education and Drug-Testing Survey (1989)). The student athletes should be required
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that Colorado state universities' athletic departments will act cau-
tiously when creating their own drug-testing policies and proce-
dures and when altering an existing program. 168 This confusion
and uncertainty regarding the law will ultimately hamper Colorado
state universities' attempts at pursuing valid governmental interests,
such as those asserted by CU. 16 9
Because the Supreme Court of Colorado did not establish a
test to determine whether a drug-testing program is constitutional,
more litigation is likely to ensue. Student athletes in Colorado will
begin to question their schools' drug-testing programs. Ultimately,
it will be up to the courts to guide university athletic departments in
creating drug-testing programs that will accomplish governmental
goals without infringing upon the student athletes' privacy inter-
ests.
Robert L. Roshkoff
to sign a consent form, indicating proper notification of the testing policy and
procedures, rather than effectuating a waiver of constitutional rights. Id. at 136.
To ensure accuracy and integrity of a drug-testing program, "[c]ommon pre-
cautionary steps include sealed specimens, tamper-proof and properly maintained
testing apparatus, a reliable off-site laboratory, an established protocol docu-
menting the chain of custody, storage of all specimens, and confirming testing."
Id. (citing Rovere, et al., Drug Testing in a University Athletic Program: Protocol and
Implementation, The Physician and Sportsmedicine, at 73-74 (Apr. 1986)). Instead
of using visual monitoring, integrity can be maintained through aural monitoring,
dye in the toilet bowl and testing the temperature of the sample. Knapp, supra
note 10, at 136-37 (citing Zirkel, Drug Testing Brings Fallout in Tippecanoe, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, at 171, Oct. 1988).
168. Various cases contain dicta indicating drug-testing procedures that
would tend to increase the likelihood of a program being deemed unconstitu-
tional. For example, direct observation of sample collection may be too invasive of
an athlete's privacy expectations. Knapp, supra note 10, at 135 (citing Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 672 n.2; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318; Council on
Scientific Affairs, Issues in Employee Drug Testing, 258JA.MA. 2089, 2090 (Oct. 16,
1987)).
Performing drug-testing in the off-season may be a further indication that the
program is overbroad. Knapp, supra note 10, at 135 (citing Bunger v. Iowa High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972)).
169. For a brief discussion of the governmental interests asserted by CU, see
supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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